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* The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 05-5315
            
ZURAB BERIDZE,
Petitioner,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
            
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A79-743-480)
Immigration Judge: Miriam K. Mills
            
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 27, 2006
Before: FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK,* District Judge.
(Filed:   December 11, 2006 )
            
OPINION OF THE COURT
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Zurab Beridze petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) summarily affirming an immigration judge’s order denying his
requested relief.  We will deny Beridze’s petition for review.
I.
Beridze, a 43-year old native and citizen of Georgia, entered the United States in
July 2002 as a visitor for pleasure.  On March 11, 2003, after overstaying his B-2 visa,
Beridze was served with a Notice to Appear before an immigration judge.  On September
16, 2004, Beridze appeared before Immigration Judge Miriam Mills (“IJ”).  He conceded
removability, but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture.  Beridze’s claims for relief rested on his stated fear that, were he to
return to Georgia, he would be killed or seriously injured by government officials on
account of his political views.  At the proceedings, the IJ heard testimony from Beridze
and considered several documentary submissions, including reports on country conditions
in Georgia and Beridze’s I-589 application statement.
Beridze testified that he was a supporter of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first
democratically-elected leader of Georgia.  According to Beridze, after Gamsakhurdia was
forced from power in 1991, over ninety percent of Georgians still supported him.  Yet,
although he claimed to support Gamsakhurdia, Beridze testified that he was never
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affiliated with a political party, nor was he “politically involved” in any way.  Beridze
further testified that, because of his support for Gamsakhurdia, his car was bombed in
May 1999, his home was attacked by gunmen in September 1999, his life was threatened
by a car bomb in January 2000, and he was beaten on his front lawn in March 2002. 
Beridze submitted no documentation to corroborate these incidents.
The IJ denied relief based on an adverse credibility determination—she cited
numerous reasons to doubt Beridze’s veracity.  Primarily, the IJ doubted that Beridze was
politically affiliated with Gamsakhurdia or that he was attacked because of his political
views.  The IJ noted that Beridze provided no affidavits from fellow Gamsakhurdia
supporters corroborating his political views.  She also found significant that Beridze
admitted that he had never been affiliated with any political party in Georgia, nor had he
ever been politically active.  Furthermore, besides there being no evidence or testimony to
establish Beridze’s political affiliation, the IJ noted that Beridze’s testimony
demonstrated an ignorance of politics in Georgia.
Furthermore, the IJ did not believe Beridze’s accounts of persecution.  For
example, the IJ doubted Beridze’s account of the 1999 shooting of his home.  Beridze had
failed to mention it in his I-589 application and failed to provide any supporting affidavits
from his parents who, as Beridze explained, were present at the time of the incident.  The
IJ also doubted the March 2002 beating, since Beridze provided no medical records, even
though he claimed that the beating resulted in two weeks of hospitalization.  Considering
the foregoing evidence, the IJ found it “totally implausible” that the violent incidents in
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1999 and 2000 resulted from Beridze’s minimal political activity in 1991.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ denied Beridze’s requests for asylum,
withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture, but allowed
Beridze to depart voluntarily within 60 days.  On appeal, the BIA summarily affirmed. 
This petition followed.
II.
The BIA had jurisdiction to review the IJ's order under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). 
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA's order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  When the BIA
summarily affirms an IJ's decision, we review the IJ's decision.  Partyka v. Attorney
General, 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 2005).  An IJ’s adverse credibility determination is
reviewed for substantial evidence.  See Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 323 (3d
Cir.2004).  Under this standard, we will uphold an adverse credibility determination
unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).
In his petition for review, Beridze claims that the IJ misinterpreted the country
conditions in Georgia and therefore improperly concluded that he would not be
persecuted upon return.  In particular, he claims that the IJ erroneously found that
changed country conditions rebutted his claim of a well-founded fear of persecution.  Yet,
as the government points out, the IJ considered Georgian country conditions not to rebut
his well-founded fear, but rather as a component of her determination that Beridze had no
such fear.  Relying in part on country conditions, but primarily on Beridze’s own
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testimony, the IJ simply did not believe that Beridze’s claimed political support of
Gamsakhurdia in the early 1990's—at a time when ninety percent of the population
supported him—led to the uncorroborated accounts of persecution almost ten years later.
Considering the evidence presented in the record, the IJ’s determination is not
without the support of substantial evidence.  The IJ based its conclusions on a
particularized assessment of Beridze’s own statements about his political affiliation and
persecution.  Beridze admitted that he never belonged to any political party and was not
actively involved in support of Gamsakhurdia.  Indeed, by failing even to recognize the
names of Georgia’s political parties, he demonstrated that he did not “know much” about
Georgian politics.  Furthermore, Beridze failed to provide documentary support for his
accounts of persecution, support that one would reasonably expect him to procure, nor did
he provide compelling explanation for his failure to do so.  Finally, Beridze presented
neither evidence nor testimony linking the four attacks to his minor political involvement
in the early 1990's—no evidence in the record compels a finding that those attacks were
motivated by Beridze’s political views.  In sum, a reasonable adjudicator could determine
that Beridze’s account of persecution was not credible.
III.
After reviewing the record, we cannot say that a reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to find that Beridze’s testimony was credible.  We therefore conclude that the
IJ’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence.  Accordingly,
we will deny Beridze’s petition.
-6-
